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Placing power in practice theory 
 
Matt Watson 
 
Practice theory must be able to account for power. This imperative has two sides, one intellectual and 
the other pragmatic. The intellectual side of the imperative comes from the ubiquity of power as a 
part of social relations. For practice theory all social relations are constituted and reproduced through 
practices. As Schatzki states ¶ERWKVRFLDORUGHUDQGLQGLYLGXDOLW\«UHVXOWIURPSUDFWLFHV· (1996: 13). 
Therefore practice theory must be able to account for how power works. The pragmatic side of the 
imperative may be less compelling, as it relies on a conviction that social theory should, in part, be 
valued for its capacity to make a positive difference in the world. For practice theory to meaningfully 
inform future change (or to convincingly account for past change), it must be able to account for 
power. 
 
Power is a fundamental concern of social theory and I am writing about it for two reasons; the first 
being the difficulty of analytically grasping what we take for power in a way that is consistent with the 
ontological commitments of practice theory. The second is that the bulk of what comprises 
contemporary work identifying with practice theory, particularly in empirical application, is typically 
conservative in terms of its practical implications. Generally, applications of practice theory that seek 
to be relevant result in arguments against the technical or behavioural preoccupations of policy 
approaches. This is despite the intellectual radicalism of practice theory, which posits an understanding 
of the social and of human subjectivity which embody a fundamental critique of the implicit theoretical 
foundations of dominant ways of conceiving and doing governing.  
 
My ambition, then, is to work through ways in which power is already present in how practice theory 
has been developed and used; and then to engage cognate fields of theory to look for an account of 
power which is coherent with practice theory. The chapter does not start from a premise that practice 
theory must have something distinctive to say about power; and much less that practice theory is the 
best means of understanding power as an aspect of the social. Rather, it starts from a conviction that, 
to fulfil its potential, practice theory needs to be able to speak of power, and so it is worth seeking a 
compatible account of power. I also aim to establish some grounds for thinking about whether practice 
theory may have something distinctive to say about power; and consider to what good this might be 
put.  
 
In all of this, there are many possible foundations to build on within the practice theory literature. For 
%DUQHV WR ´HQJDJH LQ D SUDFWLFH LV WR H[HUFLVH DSRZHUµ (2001: 28). For Nicolini, one of the five 
distinctive features of practice theory common across the full range of its expression by different 
VFKRODUV LV WKDW WKH\´IRUHJURXQG WKHFHQWUDOLW\RI LQWHUHVW LQDOOKXPDQPDWWHUVDQG WKHUHIRUHSXW
emphasis on the importance of power, conflict, and politics as constitutive elements of the social reality 
we experieQFHµ(2012: 6). Key thinkers who have shaped contemporary understandings of power are 
also included in articulations of the intellectual heritage of contemporary practice theory, including 
Bourdieu and Foucault (Reckwitz 2002) and Marx (Nicolini 2012). Along with this, current 
contributions have increasingly articulated concepts which promise to enable practice theory to move 
beyond the localism of a focus on performances of practices (Shove et al. 2012; Nicolini 2012; Schatzki 
2014), opening up the means to engage with the sorts of social phenomena such as those of 
government or commerce that are commonly identified with the exercise of power.
Placing power in practice theory  Watson 
1 
 
 
 
There are then grounds for thinking that practice theory can meaningfully engage with questions of 
power, and some foundations on which to build a discussion of that potential. The chapter moves 
towards this goal by framing the discussion with reference to fundamentally different understandings 
of power. It is impossible here to fully plumb the complexities of how power has been thought about 
and deployed in social theory (Lukes 2005). It is nonetheless useful to scope out the relatively obvious 
poles of meaning and to outline the path taken through the relations between power and practice in 
the discussion that follows.  
 
 
A first key distinction is between understanding power as an object, or as an effect. In common sense 
usage power is an object, generally understood as a capacity of a person, institution or other social 
actor. Within such a framing, it is how both power and the effects of its exercise are profoundly 
unevenly distributed which motivates both deliberate political action and critical theoretical 
engagement. Understood as object, power still has different meanings. It can refer simply to the 
capacity to act with effect (essentially making power synonymous with agency, as that is conventionally 
understood). More distinctively, power can refer to the capacity to direct or purposively influence the 
actions of others. In this meaning, power can be identified as a property of an individual ² say a monarch 
or corporate CEO ² or collective social actor like the state. It is hard to escape understandings of 
power as object or capacity. The distinctions it brings with it ² between the capacity to act with effect 
and capacity to shape the actions of others ² also prove useful in organising the following discussion. 
 
 
However, over the course of the chapter this discussion moves towards a position which repudiates 
understandings of power as an object or property. At least since Foucault, it has been increasingly 
normal for people meddling with social theory to understand power as itself an effect. It is this way of 
thinking about power which is implicit within practice theory. Indeed, to be consistent with the 
ontological commitments of practice theory, power must be understood as an effect of performances 
of practices, not as something external to them. Power only has reality in so far as it is effected, and 
made manifest, in moments of human action and doing. This position has pleasing ontological 
consistency, but seems unlikely to enable practice theory to move from the political impotence which 
I claim above as impetus for this chapter. If power only has meaningful existence in moments of human 
action and interaction, how do we account for the apparent reality of enduringly powerful social agents 
such as corporations or governments?  
 
 
In addressing this question, I engage with existing ways of thinking power and consider how current 
formulations and applications of practice theory articulate with them. This provides a basis for 
exploring the complementarity of current expressions of practice theory with Foucauldian analytics of 
power relations and of governing. Bringing these together with aspects of other complementary 
intellectual traditions provides the basis for a concluding discussion of how power can be meaningfully 
engaged with and conceptualised through practice theory, and for some reflection on what that means.  
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Is practice theory all about power? 
If power is understood at the most basic level as acting with effect, then practice theory can be 
understood as essentially being all about power. Indeed, all of the relations comprising the social are 
constituted and reproduced through the actions of humans (amidst the many nonhuman entities also 
involved in those actions). All sorts of human action have effect in this way, whether in how the 
repetitive timing of eating reproduces fundamental shared social rhythms (Southerton 2009) or in how 
the consequences of GD\ WUDGHUV· routinised actions (Schatzki 2010) cumulatively reshape financial 
markets. In accounting for both social change and the reproduction of social stability as the result of 
human action, practice theory is inherently about power, if power is seen as capacity to act with effect.  
 
Of course, emphasising the power inherent in the actions of individual humans is only part of the story. 
Practice theory is perhaps best understood for its emphasis on the shaping of human action by relations 
and phenomena external to the person performing any such action. This is so to the extent that 
practice theory is sometimes cast as denying human agency or problematising the possibility of social 
change. While such claims reflect a profound misrepresentation on both points, they highlight the 
extent to which practice theory is centrally about the shaping, as well as possibility, of action.  
 
With a focus on the shaping of action, we move closer to the second basic understanding associated 
with seeing power as object; that is, an interpretation of power as the capacity to direct or influence 
the actions of others. Understanding that action is always an effect of diverse relationships implies the 
shaping of action from elsewhere. This starting point for approaching the shaping of action remains 
rather one sided, attending to the heterogeneous phenomena that share in how action is shaped, 
rather than how power is wielded to shape it. However, leaving aside the question of how to identify 
who or what wields influence, practice theory is replete with resources for understanding the shaping 
of (the possibilities for) human action. This is perhaps clearest in relation to the roles of rules.  
 
An emphasis on the role of rules in the shaping of human action represents one of the most significant 
points of commonality between the range of scholars identified as key protagonists in the intellectual 
history of practice theory, UHIOHFWLQJ VKDUHG URRWV LQ :LWWJHQVWHLQ·V ZRUN. However, just what is 
encompassed by the concept of the rule varies. For Schatzki, ruleVDUH´ H[SOLFLWIRUPXODWLRQVSULQFLSOHV
SUHFHSWV DQG LQVWUXFWLRQV WKDW HQMRLQ GLUHFW RU UHPRQVWUDWH SHRSOH WR SHUIRUP VSHFLILF DFWLRQVµ 
(Schatzki 2010b: 79). Meanwhile for Giddens, what Schatzki refers to here as rules are formulated rules, 
´FRGLILHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIUXOHVUDWKHUWKDQUXOHVWKHPVHOYHVµ(1986: 21). Rules ² or more broadly 
the normativity of practices, however understood ² are both the grounds for and limits upon the 
possibility of meaningful and practicable action by practitioners.  
 
Amongst the ways in which the shaping of individual action is conceptualised, rules are easiest to grasp. 
Particularly in formalised or codified form, rules can look like means of exercising power in a 
conventional sense: after all, laws are prime examples of codified rules. ,QGHHGIRU6FKDW]NLUXOHV´DUH
formulations interjected into social life for the purpose of orienting and determining the course of 
activity, typically by those with the authority to enforce themµ(Schatzki 2010b: 79). However, rules, 
as apparent means of power are situated amidst a great range of other ways in which action is 
constituted and influenced. ,Q5HFNZLW]·s (2002) ¶LGHDOW\SH·SUDFWLFHWKHRU\LWLVWKHconventionalised 
assembly of the diverse elements and their interconnections which constitute the pattern reproduced 
in the performance of a practice and in the action of individual practitioners. The routes through which 
power might be considered to be exercised are still more obscure in Shove et al.·VPRGHORISUDFWLFes 
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as composed by the relations between meanings, competences and materials, even if rules and other 
means of normativity run through accounts of how practitioners integrate these elements in moments 
of performance (Shove et al. 2012). This model has provided the basis for attempts to reconceptualise 
possible targets for intervention (Shove et al. 2012: 152-163), but it has little to say about the means 
through which power operates.  
 
At first sight, other WKHRULVWV·ZRUNDSSHDUVPRUHDPHQDEOHWR developing analyses framed in terms of 
power relations. Within *LGGHQV· theory of structuration (1986), practices are the medium through 
which recursive relations between moments of human action and social structures constitute one 
another. Giddens invokes a vocabulary of power that is absent in more recent articulations of practice 
theory. For example, starting from his analysis of action he identifies the role of allocative resources 
FDSDELOLWLHVDQGDXWKRULWDWLYHUHVRXUFHV´W\SHVRIWUDQVIRUPDWLYHFDSDFLW\JHQHrating command over 
SHUVRQVRUDFWRUVµGiddens, 1986: 33) leading to consideration of the structural dimensions of social 
systems, in signification, domination and legitimation.  
 
:KLOH*LGGHQV·ZRUNRIIHUHGURXWHVIRUDUWLFXODWLQJSUDFWLFHVZLWKWKHZRUNLQJVRISRZHUBourdieu 
provides the most compelling account of the systematic reproduction of unequal distributions in 
relation to practice, through the concepts of habitus, capital and field (Bourdieu 1984). The meanings 
of these concepts, their relations to each other, and the relations of each and all of them to practice, 
are somewhat unfixed over %RXUGLHX·VZRUN. Moreover, the concepts ² particularly that of habitus ² 
cover aspects of what other theorists would consider part of practices, representing the socialised 
norms and tendencies of conduct guiding actions and dispositions, along with the ways in which social 
relations become embodied to persons in capacities, dispositions and ways of thinking. However, the 
concept of habitus enables an appreciation of social difference, which a focus on practices as the 
principal unit of analysis obscures, and it does so without resorting to individualism. While Bourdieu 
might be considered to hollow out the concept of practice, and to omit relations which others take 
to be central to an understanding of practice, he draws out concepts which facilitate the 
conceptualisation of the production and reproduction of unequal distributions, including of those 
things which constitute the capacity to act. These differences, and the processes through which they 
come about and are maintained, constitute the grounds of systematic social differences, as reified into 
concepts of class, for example. 
 
So, it is clear that practice theory can indeed be understood as being all about power. Practice theory 
demonstrably offers an understanding of how capacities to act with effect are constituted through its 
account of the relational, and profoundly social, grounds for action - understood as the performance 
of practice. However, it has not yet been shown to account for the ways in which some practices and 
practitioners are able to deliberately affect the conduct of practices and practitioners elsewhere. Yet 
in enabling one to grasp the different phenomena and relations which shape and influence patterns of 
action, practice theory should be able to account for means of executing power which involve shaping 
or directing the action of ¶others·. Practice theory must be in a position to cast distinctive light on, 
say, how inequality results from uneven distributions of the capacities to act, as explored by Walker 
(2013). However, it is harder to grasp KRZSRZHULVH[HFXWHGLQWKHGLUHFWLQJRIDQRWKHU·VDFWLRQin 
authority over others or in the core of what it takes to understand and tackle the effects of power in 
the world. 
 
This is unsurprising. The above discussion treads a line through various articulations of practice theory 
guided by an heuristic understanding of power as object. This understanding is in tension with the 
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fundamental ontological commitments of practice theory. An account of action which shows it to be 
both enabled and shaped by a distributed and heterogeneous range of phenomena and relations has 
little or no space for recognising specific instruments of power which direct action. In its basic 
expression in action, power is rendered a relational, socially constituted effect. Yet, observable 
phenomena in the social world ² powerful institutions, patterns of domination, the reproduction of 
social elites and of hegemonic ideologies ² demand some means of understanding, if practice theory is 
indeed an account of the social. Developing such a position depends on looking for different ways of 
understanding power, as effect rather than object. In attempting to grapple with power while 
understanding it as an effect, the next step is to turn to Foucault. 
 
 
Power as effect 
Turning to Foucault to help theorise power is not an unusual move, but it is somewhat ironic. He 
disavowed both the analysis of the phenomenon of power, or elaboration of the foundations of such 
analysis, as the goal of his work (Foucault 1982: 777). Fully comprehended as effect rather than object, 
power escapes analysis. What can be analysed are power relations, which are always agonistic. Some 
people and institutions are systematically advantaged by their position amidst these power relations 
and can use those relations to pursue their own ends, which can include shifting their location amidst 
power relations to further enhance relative advantage. But ultimately, no one person or entity has 
control of those relations. To understand those relations, ZHQHHGWR«WUDFH them ´GRZQWRWKHLU
DFWXDOPDWHULDOIXQFWLRQLQJµ (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 186).  
 
Questions of how institutions such as states or markets structure fields of action across space and 
time, far beyond the immediate reach of practitioners (including the situations that look most like the 
exercise of power conventionally understood) can be approached through the framing of 
governmentality)RXFDXOW·VRZQZRUNing through of governmentality is as an analytic representation of 
specific historical processes. In his 1978 lectures (Foucault 1991), the concept is developed while 
accounting for the shift in governing he identifies in 16th century Europe, from defining the purpose 
of rule to be the retention of territory, to it being the governing of population. Governmentality is 
initially an account of this sSHFLILFSURFHVVRI´WKHHQVHPEOHIRUPHGE\WKHLQVWLWXWLRQVSURFHGXUHV
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
HFRQRP\ DQG LWV HVVHQWLDO WHFKQLFDO PHDQV DSSDUDWXVHV RI VHFXULW\µ (Foucault 1991: 101). This 
characterises the rise and spread of government as the purpose of the state: a process of 
governmentalisation (Foucault 1991: 101). However, numerous scholars have further developed 
)RXFDXOW·V underlying ideas, under a burgeoning field of governmentality studies (Burchell et al. 1991; 
Dean 2009). 
 
This vein of work has done much to unpick the means ² the rationalities, techniques and apparatuses 
² through which conduct is conducted (Gordon 1991). But how is the conduct of conduct effected? 
That is, what is distinctive (rather than the same) about the practices of governing, or of corporate 
influence? What characterises those practices which have influence over the performance of other 
practices? 
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How is the conduct of conduct practiced? 
,I)RXFDXOWHQDEOHVXVWRFRQVLGHU¶WKHFRQGXFWRIFRQGXFW·LQZD\Vthat are consistent with practice 
WKHRU\·VRQWRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWV WKHUHFRXOGEH DURXWH IRUWDNLQJSUDFWLFHWKHRU\·VHQJDJHPHQW
with power beyond accounting for capacities to act and the distributed range of relations which 
converge in shaping those capacities. Can we also understand how certain practices are distinctively 
capable of orchestrating, disciplining and shaping practices conducted elsewhere?  
 
´%DVLFDOO\SRZHU LV«DTXHVWLRQRI JRYHUQPHQWµ (Foucault 1982: 789). 7KHSRWHQWLDORI)RXFDXOW·V
account of how conduct is conducted here may seem limited given that his focus is not on power but 
on governing. Clearly, power operates in, on and through practices in many ways other than through 
the actions of government as formally understood. However, for Foucault, the term government is 
not restricted to formal institutions of state, but is used in a more general sense to mean shaping the 
FRQGXFWRIRWKHUVWR´VWUXFWXUHWKHSRVVLEOHILHOGRIDFWLRQRIRWKHUVµ(1982: 790). All scales of social 
phenomena are governed, from the self, to the national and beyond. Governing can be understood as 
those actions and means through which the conduct of other people is more or less deliberately 
conducted, throughout social situations. With governing so understood, an account of how it is 
practiced promises to fill out an account of power using resources already identified within practice 
theory literature.  
 
However, for present purposes it makes sense to focus upon the power relations that act over space 
and time with the involvement of identifiable formal institutions - such as those of the state - that are 
in a position of relative dominance. Foucault himself acknowledges the value of such institutions as an 
HPSLULFDOIRFXVIRUDQDQDO\WLFVRISRZHUUHODWLRQVUHFRJQLVLQJWKDWWKH\´constitute a privileged point 
RIREVHUYDWLRQµ(1982: 791). Institutions are sometimes considered something of a stretch for practice 
theory thanks to the putative difficulty it has in dealing with social phenomena which can be understood 
as large scale. However, the flat ontology of practice theory does not mean denying the scale of 
institutions or other large social phenomena. Rather, it entails recognition that such scale is produced 
and reproduced through practices. As Schatzki explains ´DOOVRFLDO phenomeQD«DUHVOLFHVRUVHWVRI
features of the plenum of practices and arrangements, differing simply in the continuity, density and 
spatial-temporal spread and form of the practices, arrangements and relations that compose them. It 
follows that all social phenomena ² large or small, fleeting or persistent, micro or macro ² have the 
VDPHEDVLFLQJUHGLHQWVDQGFRQVWLWXWLRQµ(Schatzki 2015). 
 
The observation that social phenomena have the same basic ingredients and constitution, in whatever 
realm of the social or whatever apparent scale of social phenomena means that the practices of 
ministerial offices, cabinet rooms and corporate board rooms mostly have the same characteristics as 
the practices of domestic life or leisure pursuits. They too are comprised of meanings, rules, 
competences, embodied knowledges, materials, spaces, and more, brought together through largely 
routinised and mundane patterns of action. Increasingly, the lines of practice theory discussed above 
are being brought to bear upon institutional situations, and into articulation with approaches which 
are well established in analyses of such settings.  
 
Indeed, some lines of inquiry associated with practice theory, broadly defined, have been developed 
by authors who focus upon institutions and organisations. Much of this work is concerned with 
conceptualising learning and knowing as processes that are situated, ongoing and generally collective 
in character, even in work places that are thought to be highly rationalised. For example, questions 
about how someone becomes competent as a member of a profession or work place have been 
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addressed with reference to concepts of shared engagement, enterprise, repertoires and histories of 
learning (Wenger 1998).  More broadly, the notion of a community of practice, associated with Lave 
and Wenger (1991), has been used to represent and influence the workings of more or less identifiable 
organisations and institutions such as schools or hospitals.  
 
Orlikowski (2002) follows Lave (1988) and Suchman (1987) in understanding people comprising 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVDV ¶SXUSRVLYHDQGUHIOH[LYHFRQWLQXDOO\DQGURXWLQHO\PRQLWRULQJWKHRQJRLQJ IORZRI
DFWLRQ·(Orlikowski 2002: 249).  Whereas practice based studies of organisations typically concentrate 
on particular individuals or spatially proximal work groups, Orlikowski writes about  globalised 
processes of product development as necessarily collective arrangements distributed across 
geographically separated situations and moments of practices: in short she focuses on  ¶RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
NQRZLQJ·UDWKHUWKDQLQGLYLGXDOV·NQRZOHGJH 
 
She identifies practices that are part of belonging to and sustaining the group - of sharing identity and 
interaction; but also of the doing of the work, in spatially and temporally distributed locales, to 
common purpose. Orlikowski consequently GHYHORSVDQDFFRXQWRIDFRUSRUDWHRUJDQLVDWLRQ·VFDSDFLW\
to act as that is constituted through the widely distributed, ongoing and situated practices of people 
comprising the organisation. In accounts like these, institutions are shown to take form as distinctive 
social phenomena through shared, collective, predominantly tacit ways of shaping, enabling, disciplining 
and aligning a multitude of largely mundane practices. 
 
While Foucault acknowledges the value of an empirical focus on institutions he goes on to identify 
certain problems with such a method. These are problems which are typically associated with practice 
theory informed studies of institutions, such as those discussed above. Key here is the risk that an 
analysis of the practices comprising institutions will focus upon practices which are essentially 
reproductive of that institution. While fundamental to understanding the phenomenon of an 
institution, reproductive practices - such as informal social interaction, bodily engagement with 
technologies and so on - often lack any direct relation to the ways in which institutions act external 
to themselves. That the practices comprising work, even in spaces of state or corporate power, are 
of essentially the same emergent, relational character as practices in more obviously ¶HYHU\GD\·
situations is another important corrective to conventional rationalist accounts of the workings of state 
or economy. However, whilst an understanding of the ways in which institutions reproduce themselves 
is clearly pertinent to an understanding of how institutions operate, stressing the sameness of the 
practices involved fails to account for how power is done.  
 
)RXFDXOW·Vmeans of avoiding the problem of focusing too exclusively on the reproductive functions of 
institutions is to approach them from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa (1982: 
791).  Rather than being distracted by the mass of institutional activity that is common to social life in 
institutions and elsewhere, his method is to follow the technologies and apparatuses of governing. 
These are the mechanisms - administrative, institutional and physical- which enable the exercise of 
power.  This approach has been used to good effect. For example, Dean (2009) examines the 
GLVWLQFWLYH¶WHFKQRORJLHVRISHUIRUPDQFH·FKDUDFWHULVLQJQHR-liberal governance - the targets, audits and 
indicators through which the actions of agencies are shaped and policed. These complement parallel 
¶WHFKQRORJLHV RI DJHQF\· which are the means through which responsibility is shifted from central 
government to increasingly fragmented and diverse agencies of governing.  
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However, in the context of this discussion research that focuses on the technologies of governing is 
often limited in that it does not connect to an understanding of practices within institutions or show 
how these articulate with, constitute and operate relevant technologies and apparatuses. It therefore 
fails to characterise the practices which enable the conduct of conduct, and the accumulation of the 
necessary resources to act in such ways.  Governing over space, as is the case with institutions 
identified with the nation state, or a multinational corporation, is only possible through the marshalling, 
coordination and harnessing of countless practices, which provide financial resources (e.g. through the 
multitude of practices that generate and gather taxes or profits), information (e.g. through census) or 
threat of force (e.g. through the armed forces and police).  
 
This is because the embodied action at the core of all performances of practices can only be spatially 
and temporally immediate. As a result, the extension and amplification of action can only happen 
through intermediation. Such intermediation can rarely if ever be accomplished without depending on 
other practices as well as on technologies and more. Appreciating the ability of some practices to 
orchestrate and align others makes it possible to account for the appearance of institutional hierarchy 
and scale, and for differential capacities to act, while retaining a flat ontology. Clearly, governing 
technologies must articulate with the practices of governing which rely upon them as means of 
influence, and as means of shaping the conditions of possibility and thus the actions of others. It is this 
conjunction which is important, and which helps specify what is distinctive about the practices of 
governing.  
 
The sociology of translation provides further resources and means of developing connections between 
Foucauldian approaches to governmentality and practice theory informed understandings of 
institutions. In recent years a number of authors, coming from different starting points, but often 
inspired by the work of Bruno Latour have sought to conceptualise practices and the properties of 
large organisations. Rose and Miller (1992) recognise the need, in investigating the problematics of 
government, to ´study the humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate 
governmentµ  IURP WHFKQLTXHV RI FDOFXODWLRQ DQG FRPSXWDWLRQ and devices like surveys and 
means of data presentation, to aspects of professions and details of buildings. While principally dealing 
with Foucauldian governmentality, RRVHDQG0LOOHUWXUQWR/DWRXU·Vaccount of power in pursuing this 
project. Latour (1987; 1984) sees power as an effect of the composition and alignment of 
heterogeneous relations, rather than seeing it as an explanation of an actor·VVXFFHVVIXOFRPSRVition 
of that network of relations. The power of a given social actor is an effect of its location in networks 
of relations through which that actor can shape the actions and calculations of others. In working with 
the sociology of translation as a means of interrogating modes of neoliberal governing, Rose and Miller 
(1992) focus on inscription devices as means of making stable, mobile, comparable and combinable vast 
ranges of data involved in governing; and the ways that modes of representation so achieved work in 
enabling centres of calculation - the nodes of networks which aggregate and re-represent the flows of 
inscriptions so produced, as a means of acting over distance.  
 
In writing about action over distance, Nicolini also LQWURGXFHV/DWRXU·VZRUNdoing so as a means of 
overcoming the limits he identifies within practice theory - particularly the work of Schatzki (2012: 
179). Whilst recognising fundamental differences between Schatzki and Latour, Nicolini nevertheless 
sees the potential for linking the two approaches. Indeed, Schatzki (2015) has himself engaged with 
Latour·VZRUN in the cause of better understanding the constitution of large social phenomena. While 
restating points of difference with Actor-Network Theory (ANT), ² whereas ANT sees the social as 
comprised only by associations, Schatzki sees it as comprised of practices and arrangements - Schatzki 
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recognises commonalities in the flat ontologies underlying both. Based upon such commonalities, he 
appropriates concepts from ANT to help illuminate how large social phenomena like governments, 
corporations or universities can emerge from the plenum of practices and arrangements. 
 
7KHDWWUDFWLRQRI/DWRXU·VZRUNDQG$17PRUHEURDGO\ERWKIRU5RVHDnd Miller (2010) coming from 
a governmentality tradition, and in part for Schatzki (2015) and Nicolini (2012), LV$17·VFDSDFLW\WR
account for large phenomena and action over distance without recourse to explanation at any level 
other than that defined by actions. Concepts like centres of calculation help move governmentality-
oriented understandings of the technologies of neoliberal governance towards the practices 
comprising it. For Nicolini and Schatzki, such concepts offer ways of accounting for how practices have 
effect over time and space.  
 
:KLOH/DWRXU·VRQWRORJy has no place for practices as the basic stuff of the social, it is not difficult to 
see how practice-based accounts of the activity comprising institutions mesh with accounts of 
particular forms of association that appear to be crucial in enabling action in one locale to shape action 
over distance in another (or in many) locales. Inscriptions are outcomes of particular, normalised 
practices - practices of inscription. Similarly, the forms of calculation that characterise centres of 
calculation depend upon routinised and standardised processes of data storage and manipulation, 
which are performed and reproduced through more or less institutionalised practices of filing, 
archiving, etc. As Schatzki (2015) indicates, it is not difficult to recast sites of association and alignment 
(as seen within ANT)DV¶EXQGOHV·RISUDFWLFHV,QWXUQand as Rose and Miller (1992) discuss, particular 
modes of inscription and calculation are the stuff of technologies of governing in a Foucauldian sense. 
/DWRXU·VZRUNconsequently promises a means of developing connections between a focus on practices 
of governing and an understanding of the technologies and apparatuses through which governing is 
enacted. 
 
In their engagements with Latour, neither Nicolini nor Schatzki directly address power. Indeed 
Schatzki quickly moves to reduce any sense that one site has determinative influence, given that ´WKH
SURJUHVVLRQ RI VRFLDO DIIDLUV LV WKRURXJKO\ FRQWLQJHQWµ (Schatzki 2015: 8). Accepting this, there is 
nevertheless the problem that some sites, some organisations and some people are clearly situated in 
systematically advantageous positions amidst the associations, arrangements and alignments 
comprising social life, such that they have distinctive capacity to act purposively in ways which shape 
action over distance and across locales of action. The challenge is to develop concepts and methods 
that can help grasp how arrangements and associations of practices and the heterogeneous flows they 
are bound with are produced through, and reproduce, systematic inequities in capacities to act, 
including to act LQZD\VZKLFKVKDSHRWKHUV·FDSDFLWLHVWRDFW 
 
One possibility is to consider the ways in which Latourian sites such as centres of calculation relate to 
the properties of organisations and institutions of governing. Such institutions comprise the ordering 
and stability necessary for the complex orchestration of practice that provides both the means and 
purpose of governing. They do so through aligning and disciplining the performance of key practices 
through other practices such as objective setting, managing, disciplining and incentivising. But perhaps 
more distinctively, such institutions are characterised by the extent to which capacities to accomplish 
governing are solidified and sedimented into relatively durable properties of the institution. Means and 
functions of practice are delegated to technologies and more or less codified procedures. Buildings, 
information infrastructures, divisions of labour and hierarchical institutional relationships between 
people - are means of effectively aggregating the means of and the means to power. As Rose and Miller 
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put it "Powers are stabilised in lasting networks only to the extent that the mechanisms of enrolment 
are materialised in various more or less persistent forms - machines, architecture, inscriptions, school 
curricula, books, obligations, techniques for documenting and calculating and so forth" (1992: 183-4). 
Such materialised features of institutionalisation are part of the means through which practices are 
ordered and aligned, enabling those institutions to have effect, however constrained by the inescapable 
contingency of social life. These features also underpin an institution·V FDSDFLW\ to accumulate the 
means of extending the capacity to act, for example, in the form of money or information. At the same 
time, those features also underlie the obduracy of the practices of governing.  
 
In sum, the conduct of conduct happens through practices which, while made of the same stuff as 
other practices, have distinctive characteristics not least resulting from the ways in which they are 
aligned over time. Concepts from both governmentality and ANT help to draw those working with 
practice theory towards a recognition that QRWDOOSUDFWLFHVDUH¶WKHVDPH·DQGWKDWonly some enable 
the aggregation and alignment of the resources necessary to assemble, maintain and exert some degree 
of control via technologies of governing. Practice theory is well equipped to describe and specify 
practices which have this potential and in so doing address the missing links in understanding the 
processes of governing as constituted, reproduced and enacted through practices all of the way 
through.  
 
 
Placing power in practice theory? 
This chapter has not argued that practice theory provides the best or only way of understanding 
power. Much of power is performed through immediate interpersonal interaction, in the details of 
speech, bodily conduct and human interaction. Practice theory clearly can have things to say here, but 
power relations at this level are probably more amenable to analysis in terms of conversation analysis 
or through an ethno-methodological approach, with or without an underpinning in practice theory. 
The chapter has been more concerned with relating practice theoretical concepts to apparently 
powerful large scale phenomena, like corporations and governments. Practice theorists have 
repeatedly shown that such large phenomena are comprised through practices and the arrangements 
they produce and reproduce. But questions about the ability of a corporation to shape actions and 
accumulate resources or about the ways in which international tax laws shape trade are often better 
approached through other means. For better or worse, economic theory, or theories of political 
economy could not do the work they do if they refused to reify power relations and if instead power 
relations were always analysed through the multiple practices from which they are an effect.  
 
Like any other approach, practice theory is not going to be able to give an all-encompassing account 
of power. However, the discussion above has demonstrated that it has distinctive contributions to 
make as part of a range of related strategies that shed light on how power exists as an effect of 
collective activity and its consequences. Ultimately, power relations and their consequences only exist 
through connections between moments of the performance of practices. Showing how this works out 
with reference to the reality of large phenomena like companies, economies, states and ideologies, 
calls for a wide range of conceptual tools. In identifying affinities between practice theory, Foucauldian 
governmentality and Latourian ANT, this chapter highlights what appear to be especially promising 
options. 
 
But what does practice theory stand to gain in pursuing an understanding of power? To return to the 
imperatives noted at the start of this chapter, if practice theory can account for all aspects of the 
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social, it should be able to account for power as a pervasive aspect of the social. Second, if practice 
theory is to make a difference, it must be able to provide an account of power with which it is 
consistent. Change is likely to entail and come through changes in power relations, and purposive 
change will involve engaging in and with existing dominant power relations. In addition, engaging with 
questions of power provides a means of developing and advancing practice theory. 
  
In summary, practice theory has within it a largely unspoken account of power. It is unspoken because 
within practice theory, power is ubiquitous. A practice (as entity) shapes human action (as 
performance). While the practice as entity is only the effect of performances, any one performance is 
substantially shaped by the practice as entity. Human action is therefore always influenced from 
elsewhere: it is the effect of relationships which are arguably always power relations (relations shaping 
action and the capacity to act), however diffused and distanciated. In turn power relations are always 
and only the effect of the performance of practices, in concert with their arrangements. Further, power 
relations never result only from distinct, specifiable, moments of practice, but are effects of the 
ordering and the churn of innumerable moments of practices.  This explains why practice theory does 
not tend to focus on power as a separate or distinct SURSHUW\RIWKHVRFLDO$V%DUQHVVDLG´WDONRI
SUDFWLFHVLVWDONRISRZHUVµ(2001: 28). 
 
However, not much is gained by noticing that power is ubiquitous to practice. The more significant 
challenge is to understand power as integral to and an effect of distributed practices, whilst also 
accounting for distinct social phenomena which can be meaningfully understood as powerful. It is 
clearly relevant to point out that WKHSUDFWLFHVWDNLQJSODFHLQDPXOWLQDWLRQDO·VJOREDO+4DUH shaped 
by embodied knowledge and tacit routine, just as much as the practices of a domestic kitchen or 
amateur sports club. But the further ambition is to be able to account for the qualities of the corporate 
HQ that make it distinct from those other sites of practice, and for how these arise, while recognising 
that practices are made of the same basic stuff. The answers lie in understanding how practices are 
related to each other across different sites ² hence the importance of conceptualising the connections 
and nature of relationships between practices (Shove et al 2012, Nicolini 2012, Schatzki 2015). Tangling 
with questions about connections between practices takes on a sharper edge when the problem is 
that of explaining how some actors and sites come to be loci of a disproportionate capacity for shaping 
action elsewhere. 
 
Existing thinking in cognate fields is of value in responding to this challenge. In most respects, an 
account of power that is compatible with practice theory can be fully encompassed by )RXFDXOW·V
account of governing and of power relations. Concepts from his work, not least in relation to 
governmentality, provide a means of ordering an analysis of practices in relation to the doing of 
governing (and being governed) which is sensitive to what it is in the flow of practices that is pertinent 
in understanding particular power relations. However, )RXFDXOW·Vown work and the work comprising 
more recent governmentality studies does not develop an account of how practices and their 
performance relate to and are anchored in the action of technologies and apparatuses of governing. 
In seeking to address this question, I turned to concepts from Latourian ANT that have already been 
used in describing how practices connect and act upon one another over distance (Nicolini 2012). The 
processes of alignment and aggregation that characterise classic Latourian concepts like inscriptions, 
mobiles and centres of calculation come close to bridging between analyses of technologies and 
apparatuses of governing and accounts of practice. Working through these affinities, and identifying 
tensions and gaps between practice theory and related approaches helps specify methods of revealing 
and showing how certain practices act upon others. 
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A practice theoretically compatible approach to power relations casts new light on the processes 
underpinning and effecting them. As outlined above, the challenge is in essence one of explaining  
exactly what flows between moments of performance, of revealing the dynamics within and between 
those flows and of showing how they are distinctively aggregated and aligned to serve distinct 
purposes.  In taking up this challenge, practice theory can make a distinctive contribution to 
understanding the existence and operation of power in the social and can do so by focusing on how 
practices relate to and align with each other so as to enable and perpetuate the capacity to act, and 
to act at distance to shape conduct in other spaces and times.  
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